Estado de necesidad y daño: sobre la distinción entre justificación y excusa
"Necessity as justification takes place when the evil that has been avoided is greater than the evil that has been caused. Necessity as excuse takes place when this fact does not occur. In this paper, I will argue that: (a) even if the legal good that has been harmed has an equal rank to the le...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Departamento de Publicaciones
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.derecho.uba.ar/publicaciones/lye/revistas/97/estado-de-necesidad-y-dano.pdf http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=pderecho/lecciones&cl=CL1&d=HWA_2687 http://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/collect/pderecho/lecciones/index/assoc/HWA_2687.dir/2687.PDF |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | "Necessity as justification takes place when the evil that has been avoided is greater than the evil that has been caused. Necessity as excuse takes place when this fact does not occur. In this paper, I will argue that: (a) even if the legal good that has been harmed has an equal rank to the legal good that has been defended, and (b) even if the degree of harm would be "in a sense" equal; it is possible that necessity as a justification should be applied rather than as an excuse. I will contend that when the goods and the degree of harm are identical, the seriousness of harm should be measured considering how strong the reasons against causing such harms to the legal goodare." |
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