Posiciones infundadas en la polémica sobre Mundos Posibles
In the controversy between actualists and modal realist, the notions of logical necessity and possibility have been used to answer the question for the existence of possible worlds, defending from them their metaphysical counterparts. However, can ome be defined purely in terms of the others? Or may...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/CdF/article/view/5460 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=cufilo&d=5460_oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In the controversy between actualists and modal realist, the notions of logical necessity and possibility have been used to answer the question for the existence of possible worlds, defending from them their metaphysical counterparts. However, can ome be defined purely in terms of the others? Or maybe something else is needed? In this paper it is shown that the relation between these notions assumes previous metaphysical commitments falling into a circular justification, so it can not be a viable option to answer such a question. |
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