Scotus on the Distinction Between Nature and Haecceity
With the present article, I aim to analyze and evaluate the application of what Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) classifies as qualified distinctions to the relation between a principle of individuation, or haecceity, and the specific nature that corresponds to it. In the Scotistic milieu, a qual...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Portugués |
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Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistascientificas.filo.uba.ar/index.php/petm/article/view/14451 https://repositoriouba.sisbi.uba.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=patris&d=14451_oai |
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| Sumario: | With the present article, I aim to analyze and evaluate the application of what Duns Scotus (c. 1265-1308) classifies as qualified distinctions to the relation between a principle of individuation, or haecceity, and the specific nature that corresponds to it. In the Scotistic milieu, a qualified distinction is traditionally characterized as any distinction requiring inseparability between its distinguenda, while an unqualified distinction is usually viewed as requiring the opposite: separability. My conclusion is that the only qualified distinction able to be applied to nature and haecceity is the one Scotus calls “adequate distinction”. The other two qualified distinctions available –formal and modal– are not up for the job because relevant aspects of the nature/haecceity relation do not conform to their definitions. |
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