Pluralismo Télico Puro
Logical pluralism is a well-supported position in the philosophical community. The main problem against it is the Collapse Argument or the Normativity Objection. The argument claims that the weaker logic collapses into the strongest, and this is because it does not present the epistemic agent with a...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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ARFIL y UNL
2025
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://bibliotecavirtual.unl.edu.ar/publicaciones/index.php/index/article/view/14236 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | Logical pluralism is a well-supported position in the philosophical community. The main problem against it is the Collapse Argument or the Normativity Objection. The argument claims that the weaker logic collapses into the strongest, and this is because it does not present the epistemic agent with appropriate norms to guide his actions or for not being informative enough. To this, a response is to claim that the normativity of logic comes from certain telos or epistemic aims. Nonetheless, in this work we will show that said solution has as a weakness a new form of collapse, and in that same vein is vulnerable to hypocrisy objections. As a solution, we propose that the only remedy for the pluralist is to accept a plurality of epistemic norms coherent with each candidate to be a correct logic, giving rise to a pure telic pluralism. |
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