Leibniz e a vontade de crer

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In this paper I analyze the role of the will in the acquisition of belief according to Leibniz. As a response to both Descartes? problematic conception of judgment and the challenge of Pyrrhonian skepticism Leibniz claims that the will has only an indirect role in our judicative acts. Since beliefs...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Vargas, Evelyn
Formato: Artículo publishedVersion
Lenguaje:Portugués
Publicado: 2011
Materias:
Filosofía
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm
Escepticismo
Voluntad
Percepción
Leibniz
Belief
Will
Perception
Judgment
Crença
Vontade
Percepçao
Juízo
Acceso en línea:https://www.memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/art_revistas/pr.10842/pr.10842.pdf
Aporte de:
Memoria Académica - FaHCE (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata
Descripción
Sumario:In this paper I analyze the role of the will in the acquisition of belief according to Leibniz. As a response to both Descartes? problematic conception of judgment and the challenge of Pyrrhonian skepticism Leibniz claims that the will has only an indirect role in our judicative acts. Since beliefs are not intentionally taken actions the will can only influence what we do in order to provide new reasons or new experiences which can ground our beliefs. But given that the will is always inclined by our passions epistemic autonomy is the result of the interplay between reason and affection.

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