Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complements are Unstable
In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria -equilibria that are not in pure strategies- are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Objeto de conferencia |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
2002
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/57138 http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/semi/semi120702.pdf |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria -equilibria that are not in pure strategies- are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics. |
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