Deterrence and reciprocity effects on tax compliance: experimental evidence from Venezuela
Why do people pay taxes? One obvious answer is that there are enforcement mechanism (fines and penalties) established by the State. This deterrence approach to tax compliance has been formally analyzed in the seminal paper by Allingham and Sandmo (1972). In this model tax payers decide whether and h...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Ortega, Daniel, Sanguinetti, Pablo |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Objeto de conferencia |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
| Publicado: |
2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/35172 http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/financlocal/12-Ortega-Sanguinetti.pdf |
| Aporte de: |
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