Fiscal decentralization and voters' choices as control

This paper investigates, empirically, the voters’ choices as a mechanism of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office. After a lea...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Porto, Alberto, Porto, Natalia
Formato: Articulo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: 2000
Materias:
Ciencias Económicas
Fiscal decentralization
Local governments
Fiscal performance
Voters’ choices
Acceso en línea:http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123638
Aporte de:
SEDICI (UNLP) de Universidad Nacional de La Plata

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