Political appointees vs. career civil servants: a multiple principals theory of political bureaucracies
This paper analyzes a multiperiod delegation model with two principals and an agent. The purpose of the model is to explore the determinants of civil service structure, in particular, the use of political appointees (short lived agents) vs. civil servants (long lived agents). We see this process as...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | Spiller, Pablo T., Urbiztondo, Santiago |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Articulo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
1994
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://sedici.unlp.edu.ar/handle/10915/123094 |
| Aporte de: |
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