Conciencia y pensamientos de nivel superior
The principal aim of this paper is to expound on the higher-orderthought theory of consciousness proposed by David Rosenthal and to introduce some objections against it. It starts with a brief characterization of consciousness, as it is understood in philosophy, and points out some antecedents of Ro...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2014
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/peninsula/article/view/44441 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-058&d=article44441oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | The principal aim of this paper is to expound on the higher-orderthought theory of consciousness proposed by David Rosenthal and to introduce some objections against it. It starts with a brief characterization of consciousness, as it is understood in philosophy, and points out some antecedents of Rosenthal’s theory in the philosophy of Descartes and Locke. After having explained Rosenthal’s theory, which posits that a mental state is conscious when it is accompanied by a thought about it, it reviews the main objections it has raised and proposes strategies we could follow to answer them. Finally, it is argued that this theory could be dangerous for the normativity of thought if we claim it is valid for all mental states. |
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