El PRI ante la crisis electoral de julio de 2006: ¿lealtad institucional, traición o realpolitik?
On the presidential election held in July 2, 2006, the Institutional Revolutionary Party was set back to third place and a political crisis blowed up. The equilibrium of the PRIs internal currents was modified by the electoral results. On that context, the PRI leadership and PRI governors had to fa...
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, UNAM
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rep/article/view/23851 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-047&d=article23851oai |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | On the presidential election held in July 2, 2006, the Institutional Revolutionary Party was set back to third place and a political crisis blowed up. The equilibrium of the PRIs internal currents was modified by the electoral results. On that context, the PRI leadership and PRI governors had to face several problems. One was how to react to the political crisis that blew up in July 2 and what roll should the PRI play in that conflict. Another problem concerned the election of the new deputies and senators leaders in both legislative chambers. Both problems were hard to solve in the complex internal party context, whose main feature was the existence of three different nucleus of PRI governors who were fighting over the control of the political agenda and the distribution of party positions. |
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