Obstruction and decision-making process in the Chamber of Deputies: Brazil 1991-2010
In this article we explore how the management of governing coalitions and attributes of the dynamics of the conflict between and within governing and opposition coalitions affect obstructionist movements in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2010. Obstructionist movements are operational...
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo publishedVersion |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Universidad de Salamanca
2015
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| Acceso en línea: | http://revistas.usal.es/index.php/1130-2887/article/view/alh201570135163 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=es/es-011&d=article10786oai |
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| Sumario: | In this article we explore how the management of governing coalitions and attributes of the dynamics of the conflict between and within governing and opposition coalitions affect obstructionist movements in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies from 1991 to 2010. Obstructionist movements are operationalized by the percentage of monthly roll call votes related to procedural requirements that delay decisions on legislative proposals. We find that the proportionality in the distribution of ministerial posts reduces obstruction in minority coalitions. In larger coalitions, this type of incentive has little effect in reducing obstructionist moves. Smaller, more cohesive, and better managed governing coalitions are more capable than oversized coalitions of diminishing problems for decision making in the Chamber of Deputies. |
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