Alternative Effects of Antidumping Policy: Should Mexican Authorities be Worried?
Administered protection is not the only outcome of antidumping measures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interaction between a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the importing market, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce and sustain tacit collusion between...
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| Formato: | Artículo científico |
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Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C.
2005
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| Acceso en línea: | http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32314102 http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/gsdl/cgi-bin/library.cgi?a=d&c=mx/mx-010&d=32314102oai |
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| Sumario: | Administered protection is not the only outcome of antidumping measures. This paper suggests a basic model of repeated interaction between a domestic and a foreign firm. Competing in prices in the importing market, antidumping action serves as the means to enforce and sustain tacit collusion between the firms. The main result is that price distortions by antidumping policy are a departure point for the achievement of the collusive outcome. Discount factors of future profits are altered relative to those observed under free trade, delaying domestic firms propensity to collude and prompting foreign firms. |
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