An Aretaic Approach to Epistemic Justice: Conceptual Precisions and Practical Projections
This paper revolves around the notion of epistemic justice, a notion that will be addressed here, primarily, as an intellectual virtue. In order to provide a framework to discuss this concept, the aretaic turn in contemporary epistemology will be taken as a starting point, and concomitantly, the two...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2025
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| Acceso en línea: | https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/271 |
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| Sumario: | This paper revolves around the notion of epistemic justice, a notion that will be addressed here, primarily, as an intellectual virtue. In order to provide a framework to discuss this concept, the aretaic turn in contemporary epistemology will be taken as a starting point, and concomitantly, the two main approaches to the notion of intellectual virtue that have been taken place in this turn will be identified. In a second moment, the examination of the structure of the virtue of epistemic justice shall be provided on the basis of Miranda Fricker’s theory, which draws on a Neo-Aristotelian approach. Finally, an understanding of epistemic justice as a central virtue of adjudication shall be proposed, offering at the same time an explanation of its importance in spite of some criticisms that might be addressed against such an understanding. |
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