Logical and non-representational point of view of surrogative reasoning
In this paper we argue, from an inferential approach, that the inferential role played by a model (FIM, for its acronym in Spanish), during modeling practice, is independent of the notion of representation engaged (or not) with the chosen modeling approach. Indeed, we believe that the notion of surr...
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| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Escuela de Filosofía. Facultad de Humanidades y Artes, Universidad Nacional de Rosario
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://cuadernosfilosoficos.unr.edu.ar/index.php/cf/article/view/147 |
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| Sumario: | In this paper we argue, from an inferential approach, that the inferential role played by a model (FIM, for its acronym in Spanish), during modeling practice, is independent of the notion of representation engaged (or not) with the chosen modeling approach. Indeed, we believe that the notion of surrogative reasoning is neither subsidiary nor founded on the notion of representation and that it will only find its foundations in logic itself. Neither the notion of representation is an inferential notion nor FIM is a type of representation-based thinking. |
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