The political market and the D'Hont Electoral System in Argentina
In this brief note, we present a reflection on the still excessive simplification contained in the statement that in the political markets of supply and demand of public policies, one vote is equivalent to one unit of purchase (one peso, one dollar, one euro ) of the goods and services markets. It a...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Instituto de Economía y Finanzas
2005
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/acteconomica/article/view/4027 |
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| Sumario: | In this brief note, we present a reflection on the still excessive simplification contained in the statement that in the political markets of supply and demand of public policies, one vote is equivalent to one unit of purchase (one peso, one dollar, one euro ) of the goods and services markets. It also concludes that the presumption that politicians elected in democratic elections faithfully reflect the preferences, tastes, scales of values and ideology of voting citizens is highly questionable, and therefore we can not precisely consider them "faithful representatives and efficient maximizers of our Function of Social Welfare ", underlying principle out of all discussion and taken as a starting point in the formal construction of most conventional macroeconomic models of general equilibrium. |
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