Formal equivalence in the language of McCulloch’s and Pitts’ logical neurons
In this article we consider the significance of formal equivalence in the language proposed by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts in their original “A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity”. We study the model from the contributions that it has meant in the history of science: a...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
2022
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/34428 |
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| Sumario: | In this article we consider the significance of formal equivalence in the language proposed by Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts in their original “A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity”. We study the model from the contributions that it has meant in the history of science: as a computational theory of mind; and as a formalism that contributed to the development of automata theory and logical design. This question is framed into the mechanistic explanation account and the philosophy of scientific models, while also attending to how the model embedded a conception of a language as a logical calculus. We consider the relationship between the model and its target system, offering two possible interpretations: logical neurons are the model that represents the mind-brain or it is a new conceptual object that enables the development of artificial automata. We observe how the formal equivalence notion plays a fundamental role: as scientific explanation about mind’s theory, as an isomorphism criterion of mind’s model, and as identity criterion of logic neurons or formal neurons. |
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