Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships

The so-called “historical turn” in the philosophy of science from the sixties opened the epistemological discussion on theoretical change in the history of science and introduced the issue of discontinuity among theories, giving relevance to social and cognitive processes that contributed to explain...

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Autores principales: Zamudio, Alicia Mabel, Castorina, José
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/30265
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record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-341
container_title_str Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic teorías del cambio conceptual
inconmensurabilidad local
aplicacionismo
reflexión cruzada
conceptual change theories
incommensurability
applicationism
cross-reflection
spellingShingle teorías del cambio conceptual
inconmensurabilidad local
aplicacionismo
reflexión cruzada
conceptual change theories
incommensurability
applicationism
cross-reflection
Zamudio, Alicia Mabel
Castorina, José
Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
topic_facet teorías del cambio conceptual
inconmensurabilidad local
aplicacionismo
reflexión cruzada
conceptual change theories
incommensurability
applicationism
cross-reflection
author Zamudio, Alicia Mabel
Castorina, José
author_facet Zamudio, Alicia Mabel
Castorina, José
author_sort Zamudio, Alicia Mabel
title Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
title_short Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
title_full Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
title_fullStr Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
title_full_unstemmed Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
title_sort theoretical change in kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: a critical approach to their relationships
description The so-called “historical turn” in the philosophy of science from the sixties opened the epistemological discussion on theoretical change in the history of science and introduced the issue of discontinuity among theories, giving relevance to social and cognitive processes that contributed to explain permanence and change in different fields of knowledge. These perspectives became attractive to many researchers in science education and psychologists, interested in conceptual change involved in learning processes of scientific disciplines. In such a way, that they adopted categories related to theoretical change from the “new philosophy of science”, particularly from Kuhn’s perspective, to characterize processes of conceptual change in development and learning. We will discuss the epistemological difficulties that emerge when theorists of conceptual change in science learning try to explain this process with Kuhnian categories related to theoretical change in the development of a mature science. We understand that this assimilation of categories constitutes a form of applicationism. However, we recognize the undeniable heuristic value of cross-disciplinary reflection.
publisher Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
publishDate 2021
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/30265
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AT zamudioaliciamabel elcambioteoricosegunkuhnylasteoriasdelcambioconceptualenelaprendizajedelacienciaunamiradacriticadesusrelaciones
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first_indexed 2024-09-03T21:23:30Z
last_indexed 2025-02-05T22:08:45Z
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spelling I10-R341-article-302652025-01-01T15:10:44Z Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships El cambio teórico según Kuhn y las teorías del cambio conceptual en el aprendizaje de la ciencia: Una mirada crítica de sus relaciones Zamudio, Alicia Mabel Castorina, José teorías del cambio conceptual inconmensurabilidad local aplicacionismo reflexión cruzada conceptual change theories incommensurability applicationism cross-reflection The so-called “historical turn” in the philosophy of science from the sixties opened the epistemological discussion on theoretical change in the history of science and introduced the issue of discontinuity among theories, giving relevance to social and cognitive processes that contributed to explain permanence and change in different fields of knowledge. These perspectives became attractive to many researchers in science education and psychologists, interested in conceptual change involved in learning processes of scientific disciplines. In such a way, that they adopted categories related to theoretical change from the “new philosophy of science”, particularly from Kuhn’s perspective, to characterize processes of conceptual change in development and learning. We will discuss the epistemological difficulties that emerge when theorists of conceptual change in science learning try to explain this process with Kuhnian categories related to theoretical change in the development of a mature science. We understand that this assimilation of categories constitutes a form of applicationism. However, we recognize the undeniable heuristic value of cross-disciplinary reflection. El denominado “giro historicista” en la filosofía de la ciencia de los años 60 abrió la discusión epistemológica sobre el cambio teórico en la historia de la ciencia, introduciendo el problema de la discontinuidad entre las teorías y otorgando relevancia a los procesos sociales y cognitivos que contribuían a explicar la permanencia y el cambio en diferentes campos del conocimiento. Esta perspectiva resultó atractiva para muchos investigadores en la enseñanza de las ciencias y psicólogos interesados en los cambios conceptuales involucrados en los procesos de aprendizaje de las disciplinas científicas. A tal punto, que adoptaron algunas categorías relativas al cambio teórico propias de la nueva filosofía de la ciencia, y en particular de la perspectiva de Kuhn, para caracterizar procesos de cambio conceptual de los sujetos en el desarrollo y el aprendizaje. En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar algunos de los problemas que podrían resultar del uso de esas categorías, específicamente de la noción de inconmensurabilidad, si se consideran las diferencias del sujeto del cambio conceptual en la historia de la ciencia y en los procesos de aprendizaje de conceptos científicos y las condiciones específicas de sus transformaciones. Argumentaremos que la especificidad de los procesos de cambio conceptual en el aprendizaje plantea dificultades epistemológicas para que éste pueda ser explicado a partir de algunas categorías kunhianas relativas al cambio teórico en el desarrollo de una ciencia madura, tal como lo han intentado algunos investigadores. Entendemos que este proceso de asimilación categorial constituye una forma de aplicacionismo. Sin embargo, reconocemos el innegable valor heurístico de la reflexión cruzada entre disciplinas. Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades 2021-11-10 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/30265 10.61377/ehc.30265 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; Vol. 6 No. 1 (2021): Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; 139-157 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; Vol. 6 Núm. 1 (2021): Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; 139-157 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; v. 6 n. 1 (2021): Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia; 139-157 2525-1198 spa https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/30265/35630 Derechos de autor 2021 Epistemología e Historia de la Ciencia http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0