Theoretical change in Kuhn and conceptual change theories in science learning: A critical approach to their relationships
The so-called “historical turn” in the philosophy of science from the sixties opened the epistemological discussion on theoretical change in the history of science and introduced the issue of discontinuity among theories, giving relevance to social and cognitive processes that contributed to explain...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades
2021
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/afjor/article/view/30265 |
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| Sumario: | The so-called “historical turn” in the philosophy of science from the sixties opened the epistemological discussion on theoretical change in the history of science and introduced the issue of discontinuity among theories, giving relevance to social and cognitive processes that contributed to explain permanence and change in different fields of knowledge. These perspectives became attractive to many researchers in science education and psychologists, interested in conceptual change involved in learning processes of scientific disciplines. In such a way, that they adopted categories related to theoretical change from the “new philosophy of science”, particularly from Kuhn’s perspective, to characterize processes of conceptual change in development and learning. We will discuss the epistemological difficulties that emerge when theorists of conceptual change in science learning try to explain this process with Kuhnian categories related to theoretical change in the development of a mature science. We understand that this assimilation of categories constitutes a form of applicationism. However, we recognize the undeniable heuristic value of cross-disciplinary reflection. |
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