Fiscal decentralization, tax competition, and federal tax administration: A note from the Argentine experience
The paper analyses the usual arguments discussed in the fiscal federalismliterature about fiscal decentralization through normative and positive(public choice) approaches. Afterwards, limits to enhance significantlyfiscal decentralization in countries with important regional asymmetrieslike Argentin...
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| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba.
2004
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3805 |
| Aporte de: |
| Sumario: | The paper analyses the usual arguments discussed in the fiscal federalismliterature about fiscal decentralization through normative and positive(public choice) approaches. Afterwards, limits to enhance significantlyfiscal decentralization in countries with important regional asymmetrieslike Argentina are analyzed. Finally, the author suggests the necessity ofa fiscal institutional reform, which allows an efficient and responsiblevertical coordination. A superlative role is assigned to the federal revenueadministration in the suggested reform. |
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