How are decisions made at the IMF? The incidence of the central countries in the granting of the "shield" to Argentina in 2001
While there is ample evidence of the impact of the central countries governments’ on the IMF's behavior, questions arise regarding how conflicts between them are resolved, and what is the scope they have on the Fund’s behavior. In this paper two objectives are proposed. First, it is examined th...
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| Formato: | Artículo revista |
| Lenguaje: | Español |
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Centro de Estudios Históricos “Prof. Carlos S. A. Segreti”
2013
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/refa/article/view/34055 |
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| Sumario: | While there is ample evidence of the impact of the central countries governments’ on the IMF's behavior, questions arise regarding how conflicts between them are resolved, and what is the scope they have on the Fund’s behavior. In this paper two objectives are proposed. First, it is examined the relevance and significance of the Minutes of the IMF Executive Board meeting as a primary source for the analysis of the incidence of central countries’ interests on the organism. Second, based on the evidence contained in the Minutes of the IMF Executive Board meeting of January 12, 2001 in which it was decided to approve the “blindaje”, it is analyzed the position of the G7 countries regarding the continuity of convertibility. There are four positions that reflect differences within that block, standing out the critical positions. |
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