Selection rules for Sales Tax audits

In this paper we discuss the relevance of the major results found on theliterature about optimal auditing rules to the case of a commodity tax. Wefound out that literature’s usual recommendations are not applied by taxadministrations. In our understanding, this happens because of: i) there isa key d...

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Autor principal: Arias, Roberto José
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Español
Publicado: Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. 2004
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Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3806
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id I10-R10article-3806
record_format ojs
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-10
container_title_str Revistas de la UNC
language Español
format Artículo revista
topic impuesto a las ventas
reglas de auditoría
tax on the sales
audit rules
spellingShingle impuesto a las ventas
reglas de auditoría
tax on the sales
audit rules
Arias, Roberto José
Selection rules for Sales Tax audits
topic_facet impuesto a las ventas
reglas de auditoría
tax on the sales
audit rules
author Arias, Roberto José
author_facet Arias, Roberto José
author_sort Arias, Roberto José
title Selection rules for Sales Tax audits
title_short Selection rules for Sales Tax audits
title_full Selection rules for Sales Tax audits
title_fullStr Selection rules for Sales Tax audits
title_full_unstemmed Selection rules for Sales Tax audits
title_sort selection rules for sales tax audits
description In this paper we discuss the relevance of the major results found on theliterature about optimal auditing rules to the case of a commodity tax. Wefound out that literature’s usual recommendations are not applied by taxadministrations. In our understanding, this happens because of: i) there isa key difference between the assumed objective (theoretical) of the taxadministration and the actual objectives, ii) every model assumes that taxpayers know audit rules, when in fact they are kept confidential by thetax administration. iii) most models restrict tax evasion to underreporting,iv) there might be practical or non-economical issues that prevent taxadministrations using optimal auditing rules. We conclude that optimalaudit rules bring in a very important issue usually neglected when taxadministrations design an auditing policy: the impact of the audit policyon the returns of non-audited taxpayers.
publisher Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba.
publishDate 2004
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/3806
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