Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011

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We examine the impact of decentralized public policy in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of...

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Autores principales: Freille, Sebastián, Capello, Marcelo
Formato: Artículo revista
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. 2014
Materias:
reelection
transfers
fiscal policy
local governments
H72
C23
C25
reelección
transferencias
política fiscal
municipios
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938
Aporte de:
Revistas de la UNC de Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
id I10-R10-article-14938
record_format ojs
spelling I10-R10-article-149382022-04-06T18:45:58Z Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011 Efectos electorales de las transferencias fiscales intergubernamentales: Una aplicación para las elecciones locales en la provincia de Córdoba, 1995-2011 Freille, Sebastián Capello, Marcelo reelection transfers fiscal policy local governments H72 C23 C25 reelección transferencias política fiscal municipios H72 C23 C25 We examine the impact of decentralized public policy in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. We find that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretionary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner-up in the previous election. Finally, we find evidence that the amount of discretionary transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables. Analizamos el impacto de la política pública descentralizada bajo la forma de transferencias fiscales inter-gubernamentales sobre los resultados electorales a nivel local. Usando una base de datos especialmente compilada para este trabajo, examinamos el impacto de diferentes tipos de transferencias inter-gubernamentales sobre la probabilidad de reelección. Encontramos que la probabilidad de reelección de los incumbentes es creciente en las dummies de incumbencia para los dos principales partidos. Los gobiernos locales que reciben un monto positivo de transferencias discrecionales desde el gobierno provincial también poseen mayores probilidades de ser reelegidos. La probabilidad de reelección también es creciente en relación a la diferencia en el porcentaje de votos entre el primero y el segundo en la eleccion previa. Finalmente, encontramos evidencia de que el monto de transferencias discrecionales per capita afecta positivamente la probabilidad de reelección sólo en aquellos gobiernos locales alineados políticamente con el gobierno provincial. Nuestros resultados son robustos a la inclusión de variables de control adicionales. Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba. 2014-12-01 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938 Revista de Economía y Estadística; Vol. 52 No. 1 (2014); 113-135 Revista de Economía y Estadística; Vol. 52 Núm. 1 (2014); 113-135 2451-7321 0034-8066 10.55444/2451.7321.2014.v52.n1 eng https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938/14900 Derechos de autor 2014 Sebastián Freille, Marcelo Capello http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
institution Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
institution_str I-10
repository_str R-10
container_title_str Revistas de la UNC
language Inglés
format Artículo revista
topic reelection
transfers
fiscal policy
local governments
H72
C23
C25
reelección
transferencias
política fiscal
municipios
H72
C23
C25
spellingShingle reelection
transfers
fiscal policy
local governments
H72
C23
C25
reelección
transferencias
política fiscal
municipios
H72
C23
C25
Freille, Sebastián
Capello, Marcelo
Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
topic_facet reelection
transfers
fiscal policy
local governments
H72
C23
C25
reelección
transferencias
política fiscal
municipios
H72
C23
C25
author Freille, Sebastián
Capello, Marcelo
author_facet Freille, Sebastián
Capello, Marcelo
author_sort Freille, Sebastián
title Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_short Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_full Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_fullStr Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_full_unstemmed Electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: An application to local elections in the province of Cordoba, 1995-2011
title_sort electoral effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: an application to local elections in the province of cordoba, 1995-2011
description We examine the impact of decentralized public policy in the form of intergovernmental fiscal transfers on local election outcomes –the probability of reelection. We assemble a new and unique dataset recording every local executive election in the period 1995-2011 and examine the electoral effect of various types of intergovernmental fiscal transfers. We find that the odds of reelecting local incumbents are increasing in the incumbency dummies for both major parties. Local governments which receive a positive discretionary transfer from the provincial government have also associated higher odds of being reelected. The probability of reelection is also increasing in the difference in the vote share between the winner and the runner-up in the previous election. Finally, we find evidence that the amount of discretionary transfers per capita affect positively the probability of reelection only in those governments aligned with the provincial government. Our results are robust to controlling for other potential explanatory variables.
publisher Instituto de Economía y Finanzas. Facultad de Ciencias Económicas. Universidada Nacional de Córdoba.
publishDate 2014
url https://revistas.unc.edu.ar/index.php/REyE/article/view/14938
work_keys_str_mv AT freillesebastian electoraleffectsofintergovernmentalfiscaltransfersanapplicationtolocalelectionsintheprovinceofcordoba19952011
AT capellomarcelo electoraleffectsofintergovernmentalfiscaltransfersanapplicationtolocalelectionsintheprovinceofcordoba19952011
AT freillesebastian efectoselectoralesdelastransferenciasfiscalesintergubernamentalesunaaplicacionparalaseleccioneslocalesenlaprovinciadecordoba19952011
AT capellomarcelo efectoselectoralesdelastransferenciasfiscalesintergubernamentalesunaaplicacionparalaseleccioneslocalesenlaprovinciadecordoba19952011
first_indexed 2022-08-20T00:58:08Z
last_indexed 2022-08-20T00:58:08Z
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